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ìTwo players are involved in a joint project during which a decision must be reached. Each player has private 
information about future profits. Authority gives one player the right to decide first in a pre-defined set of 
alternatives. In this framework, I show that (partial) authority should be assigned to the player who gets the 
highest share of the total surplus. This organizational architecture replicates the performance of an optimal 
revelation mechanism without the cost of hiring a third party acting as a principal. 
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Authority or control rights deﬁned as “the right to decide” is a major issue in
organizations and, more generally, in contract relationships. It aﬀects not only
the distribution of beneﬁts among contracting partners, but also the performance
of the whole organization. As a result, it is one of the central issues raised during
contractual negotiations.
Over 40 years ago, Herbert Simon deﬁned authority as the right to select
actions from a set of alternatives aﬀecting part or the whole of an organization.1
More recently, Aghion and Tirole (1997) added that authority may result from
an implicit or explicit contract allocating the right to decide on speciﬁed matters
to a member or a group of members in the organization. Beyond this deﬁnition,
authority is a relative concept: there may be various degrees of authority leading
to several levels of delegation. Decisions are more or less precise, leaving freedom
and initiative to subordinates. In short, a hierarchical structure is determined by
who has authority and on what.
Who should hold authority in organizations? The incomplete contract ap-
proach gives us a clear answer: when partners make non-contractible proﬁt-
enhancing investments, authority should be assigned to the partner who's invest-
ment yields the higher marginal beneﬁt to the organization (Grossman and Hart,
1986). This approach relies on the assumption of non-contractible features such
as speciﬁc investments and future outcomes. It mainly stresses the fact that con-
trol rights are allocated as a means of alleviating such contract incompleteness.
The theory of Aghion and Tirole (1997) on formal and real authority has the
same ﬂavor. The partners' speciﬁc investments consist of information gathering
on projects'returns.
With complete contracts and private information, the answer is less clear. The
old saying that “knowledge is power” suggests that the distribution of information
within the organization should matter. This is certainly the case when only one
1“We will say that B [the ”boss”] exercises authority over W [the ”worker”] if W permits B to
select x [an element in the set of speciﬁc actions W performs]. That is, W accepts authority when
his behavior is determined by B's decision. In general, W will accept authority only if x0, the x
chosen by B, is restricted to some given subset (W's ”area of acceptance”) of all possible values.
This is the deﬁnition of authority that is most generally employed in modern administrative
theory.” (Simon 1951, p. 294)
2agent in an organization has private information. In standard principal-agent
models, the informed player reveals his information by selecting an allocation
in the menu of contracts via a message. In doing so, he exerts full authority.
The principal is quite passive: he, at most, executes the action selected by the
agent. With more than one informed player, for instance in bilateral asymmetric
information, the picture is diﬀerent. On the one hand, assigning full authority to
one player might not be any more eﬃcient since valuable information is lost when
this player takes all decisions without referring to its partner. This case calls for
partial authority, to some level of delegation. On the other hand, the Revelation
principle tells us that any organizational architecture cannot beat centralization of
authority in the hands of an uninformed third party. This third party collects all
private information and then takes the best decision (see, for example, Myerson,
1982). However, this principle relies on the existence of such an uninformed and
benevolent third party, immune to collusion, renegotiation or others manipulation
of information. It also assumes unlimited and costless communication, as well as
full commitment on messages.2
The aim of this paper is to propose a complete-contract theory of authority
in a multi-private information organization. In a two-sided asymmetric informa-
tion framework, I show that the bilateral organization can do as well as with
an uninformed third party via an appropriate hierarchical structure. Hence, this
third party is useless. Additional incentive problems and ineﬃciencies induced
by collusion (e.g. Laﬀont and Martimort, 1997, Beliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om, 1998) or
costly communication (e.g. Memulad, Mookerjee and Reichelstein, 1997, Radner
1993) can be avoided. Moreover, I show that whoever has authority might matter.
The optimal assignment of authority depends mainly on the partners' bargaining
power or, more generally, on how the total surplus is divided.
The model considered here is one of hidden information with limited liability.
After contracting, each partner has private information which aﬀects future proﬁts.
The two partners subsequently coordinate on decisions. Contracts are written
contingently on future events, all perfectly foresighted. The contract speciﬁes who
has authority and on what. It allows for various degrees of delegation.
More precisely, the partners agree on a menu of allocations (decisions and pay-
2See Poitevin 2000 for a survey on other motives for non-trivial allocation of authority once
some assumptions underlying the revelation principle are relaxed.
3ments) contingent on future states of nature and on a hierarchical structure. The
hierarchical structure stipulates who has authority (the leader) and on what set of
alternatives. I deﬁne authority by the right to choose ﬁrst in a set of alternatives.
This set of alternatives is pre-deﬁned in the contract. When making its choice
(i.e. choosing amongst alternatives), the leader conveys some information to its
partner. Then the other player (the subordinate) picks up an allocation in the
selected set of alternatives. By doing so, it also reveals its own information along
the equilibrium path. In this sense, authority deﬁnes a sequence of communica-
tion, with the leader communicating before the subordinate. This sequence of
communication aﬀects the incentives to reveal information truthfully in a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Formally, it aﬀects the incentive-compatible constraints.
In the paper, I ﬁrst consider a message game in the traditional mechanism de-
sign sense as a benchmark. The two agents send messages to an uninformed and
benevolent third party who then selects an allocation in the contract menu. The
allocations implemented in a direct revelation mechanism of this game are second-
best. They satisfy interim incentive-compatible constraints for each player (i.e.
in expectation of its partner's information given its own information). According
to the Revelation principle, the agents' second-best (expected) payoﬀs constitute
upper bounds on what can be achieved in a Bayesian equilibrium. Then I allow
only for sequential communication amongst the two agents, i.e. sequential mech-
anisms. The incentive-compatible constraints are still in their interim form for
the leader but they must hold now ex post for the subordinate. These constraints
are therefore more stringent, meaning that the performance of the organization
(i.e. the expected total surplus to be shared amongst the agents) can be aﬀected.
It turns out that the second-best (expected) payoﬀs can be achieved in bilateral
contracting by the right sequence of communication. This sequence assigns the
ﬁrst move to the player who gets the higher share of the whole surplus.
Our model describes many real interactions. In a supplier-retailer relation-
ship or upstream-downstream relationship within a ﬁrm, the supplier/upstream
production unit has private information about its production costs whereas the
retailer/marketing unit has superior data about the state of the demand. They
must coordinate on a production level, on the design and/or the quality of the
product. In technological alliances between pharmaceutical companies and biotech
start ups, these two ﬁrms coordinate on a project to develop a new drug. The
4ﬁrst ﬁrm has better knowledge of the drug market value whereas the later has a
better idea of its chemical properties. Another example is the implementation of
a polluting production plant. The project involves the polluting ﬁrm which is well
aware of its private beneﬁt from producing the polluting goods, the victims of the
pollution, and the environmental regulation agency which has better information
on the environmental damage. The two partners must coordinate on emission
levels.3
In the economic literature, the framework closest to the present one is Maskin
and Tirole's (1990) principal-agent model with an informed principal, with pri-
vate values. However, Maskin and Tirole assume that the players contract when
they are already informed, whereas here they contract in a situation of symmetric
information. Maskin and Tirole consider an adverse selection problem whereas
our framework is one of hidden information with limited liability. They suppose
that the principal has all bargaining power whereas I allow for any distribution of
bargaining powers. Several papers address the issue of delegated contracting in a
principal-two agents model (e.g. Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995),
Laﬀont and Martimort, 1998 in adverse selection models; Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om,
1998, P´ erez-Castrillo and Macho-Stadler, 1998, in moral hazard models). They
show that the performance of an optimal revelation mechanism can be replicated,
or is dominated (in case of collusion), by a three-tier hierarchy, wherein the prin-
cipal contracts with only one agent and delegates to that agent the authority to
contract to the other agent. Here I focus on authority and delegation of decision-
making in bilateral contracts without a principal.4 Another branch of the literature
analyzes delegation of authority as an alternative to communication when, due
to contractual incompleteness, communication entails ineﬃciencies (e.g. Bester,
2003, Cremer, 1995, Dessein, 2002, Kr¨ ahmer, 2002). Here authority determines
the way information is communicated, one way being more eﬃcient than another.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 studies the second-best allocations, that is, the allocations implemented
in a direct mechanism with an uninformed third player as a benchmark. The
3Note that, consistently with the model, in all these examples information has a private value.
See Maskin and Tirole (1990) for other examples.
4Note that a principal is deﬁned here as an uniformed player who collects message and then
selects an allocation.
5implementation of these second-best allocations in bilateral contracting under two
hierarchical structures is analyzed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 contains con-
cluding remarks.
2 The model
Two agents, 1 and 2, undertake a joint project during which a decision x (e.g.
production, quality, price) must be reached. I assume x 2 X where X is a compact
set. The relationship is initiated by a contract. After the contract is signed, each
player i observes a random variable µi which represents i's private information.
Assume µ1 2f L;Hg, and µ2 2f l;hg.
Player i has state-contingent preferences over action x deﬁned by ui(x;µi). The
function ui is monotonic, continuously diﬀerentiable and concave on x. In Maskin-
Tirole's terms, private information has private value. It is assumed that Player 1
prefers H to L in the precise sense that u1(x;H) >u 1(x;L) for any action x>0.
Symmetrically, Player 2 prefers h to l, that is u2(x;h) >u 2(x;l) for any x>0. Let
∆u1(x)=u1(x;H)¡u1(x;L) and ∆u2(x)=u2(x;h)¡u2(x;l). Examples of such
functions include proﬁts, production costs, revenue from marketing a product, and
utility functions.5
In this framework, a state of nature is a vector µ =( µ1;µ 2), often simply
denoted as µ1µ2. There are four states of nature: Hh is the best state, Hl and
Lh are two medium states, and Ll is the worst state. The set of states of nature
is denoted Ω = fLl;Hl;Lh;Hhg. Denote p(µ) the probability of µ, p(µi) the
probability of µi, and p(µijµj) the probability of µi given the realization of µj.I
put no restriction on these probabilities except that they are all strictly positive.6
The organization surplus (or the project return) is denoted ¼(x;µ)=u1(x;µ1)+
u2(x;µ2) for every state of nature µ 2 Ω. I assume that it is strictly concave and
non-negative over X, and attains its maximum value at a single point x¤
µ. Players
perform transfers amongst themselves. We denote ti the transfer received by i.
An allocation is a vector a =( x;t1;t 2). An allocation rule A is a menu of
5Note that they satisfy the single-crossing (often called Mirless-Spence) condition.
6In particular, I allow for some correlation of information (except, of course, full correlation).
Note that Cremer and MacLean's full extraction of the result in case of correlated information
(Cremer and McLean, 1988) does not hold here because I assume limited liability.
6allocations aµ =( xµ;t 1
µ;t 2
µ) contingent on each state of nature µ 2 Ω. A contract
C is deﬁned by:
² an allocation rule A = faµgµ2Ω;
² an assignment of authority L 2f 1;2g on a set P(A) of alternatives A.
Formally, P(A) is a partition of A. Authority gives to Player L, the “leader”, the
right to choose an alternative A 2P (A). The other player, the “subordinate”,
labelled S, selects an allocation a 2 ˆ A. We will say that L exerts full authority if
the set of alternatives is the menu of actions: P(A)=ffag2A g . In contrast, L
exerts partial authority if P(A) is any coarsest partition of A (except, of course,
P(A)=fAg).
The sequence of actions is as follows.
1. The two players get together and agree to some contract C.
2. Each agent i observes its private information µi.
3. The contract is carried out.
3.1 The leader L chooses an alternative ˆ A 2P(A).
3.2 The subordinate S chooses an allocation ˆ a 2 ˆ A.
3.3 The decision is executed and transfers are paid as prescribed by the
contract.
I do not explicitly model the bargaining process at Stage 1. I derive the equilibrium
contract for any outcome of the bargaining process. Formally, denoting Player i's
expected payoﬀ Ui = Eµ[ui(xµ;µ i)+ti
µ] for i =1 ;2, the agreement divides the
total surplus Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)] into two shares U1 and U2 so that:
U1 + U2 = Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)]: (1)
I will analyze the equilibrium contract for any divide (U1;U 2) of the surplus.7
7The model thus encompasses all forms of bargaining solutions. For instance, in principal-
agent models, the principal, say i, has all bargaining power up to the agent's reservation utility. In
this case, Uj denotes the agent's reservation utility while the principal gets Ui = Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)]¡Uj.
In bargaining games, Ui =( Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)]¡Ui)
¸ and Uj =( Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)]¡Uj)
1¡¸ where ¸ 2 (0;1)
represents i's bargaining power and Ui and Uj represent the players' outside options.
7I assume that both players are protected by limited liability: their payoﬀ
cannot be negative. This restriction on ex post payoﬀ is endogenized by assuming
that any agent can quit the relationship at any stage (or that they cannot commit
ex ante not to do so ex post).8
3 Second-best decisions
In this section, I wish to characterize the best decisions that can be implemented
in the above framework. For this purpose, I adopt a mechanism design approach.
I consider a (ﬁctitious) message game as a benchmark. I identify the allocation
implemented by a direct revelation mechanism of this message game. In other
words, I suppose that a benevolent and uninformed third party can centralize all
information. Formally, I consider the following contractual execution subgame at
Stage 3 in the above game:
3.1 Each player i sends a message ˆ µi to a third party.
3.2 The third party selects the allocation aˆ µ1ˆ µ2. It orders to execute xˆ µ1ˆ µ2 and
to pay tˆ µ1ˆ µ2 as prescribed by the contract.
I focus on the optimal allocations implemented in Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) of this message game in which all information is truthfully revealed to
the Principal. These allocations are called the second-best allocations and de-
noted fasb
µ gµ2Ω = fxsb
µ ;t 1sb
µ ;t 2sb
µ gµ2Ω. These second-best allocations maximize the
organization surplus Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)] subject to the following constraints, for every
µ 2 Ω;µ i;µ0
i;µ i 6= µ0
i;µ j;i=1 ;2;j=1 ;2:
Eµ[ui(xµ;µ i)+ti













The ﬁrst two constraints IR1 and IR2 are individual rational or participation
constraints stipulating that each agent accepts the contract. The second set of
8Another way to endogenize the limited liability constraint is to suppose that players can
undertake an action a = 0 that gives 0 payoﬀ. See Sappington (1993) for detailed justiﬁcations
of this assumption.
8constraints, ICi
µi for i =1 ;2 are incentive-compatible constraints, stipulating that
i has incentive to report truthfully her or his information for i =1 ;2. The third
set of constraints, LLi
µ for every µ 2 Ω, and i =1 ;2 are limited liability con-
straints, stipulating that i gets a positive payoﬀ in every state of nature. The last
constraints BBµ are budget balance constraints that make sure that transfers are
balanced in each state of nature.
The revelation principle ensures that the second-best surplus Eµ[¼(xsb
µ ;µ)] is
the higher expected beneﬁt that the two partner can achieve with a revelation
mechanism. Hence, this game provides an upper bound on total surplus. For my
purpose, I focus only on decisions fxsb
µ gµ2Ω as part of any second-best allocation.
I establish two propositions.
Proposition 1 The second-best decisions are ﬁrst-best only if
U1 ¸ p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(x¤
Lµ2)jH] and U2 ¸ p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(x¤
µ1l)jh].
Proof: I show that if fx¤
µgµ2Ω is implemented then U1 ¸ p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(x¤
Lµ2)jH].
First, LL1
Lµ2 satisﬁed implies t1
Lµ2 ¸¡ u1(x¤
Lµ2;L) for µ2 = l;h. Together with IC1
H






Lµ2 satisﬁed for µ2 = l;h imply:
Eµ2[u1(x¤
Lµ2;L)+t1
Lµ2jL] ¸ 0: (3)





That is U1 ¸ p(H)Eµ1[∆u1(x¤
Lµ2)jH].
A symmetrical proof can be computed to show that if fx¤
µgµ2Ω is implemented
then U2 ¸ p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(x¤
µ1l)jh]. 2
Proposition 1 implies that for the ﬁrst-best decisions to be implemented, play-
ers' expected utility (or reservation utility) must be high enough but not too high.9







Lµ2)jH]; and U2 ¸ p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(x
¤





µ1l)jh] due to total surplus sharing as deﬁned in Equation 1.
9We assume that, when U1 and U2 satisfy Proposition 1 bounds, ﬁrst-best deci-
sions can be implemented. That is, there exist transfers ft1
µ;t 2
µgµ2Ω satisfying all
constraints with decisions fx¤
µgµ2Ω.
Before proceeding, we need to introduce new notation. For µ1 = L;H, deﬁne
xm2








and, for µ2 = l;h, deﬁne xm1








With this new piece of notation, I can now set out the following results.






Hµ2, for any µ2 = l;h, when
p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(xm1







µ1h, for any µ1 = L;H, when
p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(xm2
µ1l)jh] · U2 <p (h)Eµ1[∆u2(x¤
µ1l)jh].
Proof: To satisfy Player 1's limited liability and incentive constraints when
U1 <p (H)Eµ2[∆u1(x¤
Lµ2)jH], transfers must be set at t1
Lµ2 = ¡u1(xLµ2;L) for
µ2 = l;h. Then IC1
H implies Eµ2[t1
Hµ2 ¡ u1(xHµ2)jH]=Eµ2[∆u1(xLµ2)jH]. Player
1's expected payoﬀ is U1 = p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(xLµ2)jH] while Player 2's is U2 =





Hhg and U1 = p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(xm1
Lµ2)jH]. When U1 in-
creases (and therefore U2 decreases), the total surplus Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)] is increased
by an increase of xLl and xLh from bottom values xm1
Ll and xm1
Lh up to opti-
mal values x¤
Ll and x¤




Lµ2 for µ2 = h;l range between xm1
Lµ2 and x¤
Lµ2. The proof
is symmetric for the second part of Proposition 2. 2
Proposition 2 contains two kinds of information. First, it identiﬁes conditions
on players's payoﬀ values such that ﬁrst-best decisions cannot be implemented
10and, therefore, some second-best decisions are indeed implemented. Second, it
characterizes these second-best decisions.
It is easy to understand Proposition 2 by referring to the seminal principal-
agent model as a special case of our model. Recall that in standard principal-agent
models, the principal retains all bargaining power up to the agent's reservation
utility usually normalized to 0. However, in order to induce truth-telling, the
contract assigns an informational rent to the agent.10 This information rent cor-
responds to the supplementary (expected) payoﬀ the agent can gain by pretending
its utility is low when it is actually high (formally p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(xLµ2)jH] for 1
and p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(xµ2l)jh] for 2). The distorted decisions solve a trade-oﬀ between
maximizing the total surplus and minimizing the informational rent. They are
lower than the ﬁrst-best actions. The minimized informational rent gives a lower
bound on the agent's payoﬀ.
When the agent gets more bargaining power, that is Uj increases and becomes
higher than the informational rent, then the distorted decisions increase and move
closer to the ﬁrst-best ones. Finally, the ﬁrst-best decisions can be implemented
once Uj is equal to or higher than the information rent with ﬁrst best decisions,
namely p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(x¤
Lµ2)jH] for 1 and p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(x¤
µ2l)jh] for 2. When Uj
becomes so high that Ui is lower than i's informational rents at ﬁrst-best decision
levels, ﬁrst-best decisions cannot be implemented anymore. The general picture
is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
10Note that limited liability is the key assumption implying that, contrary to d'Aspremont and
G´ erard-Varet (1979), ﬁrst-best decisions cannot be implemented for extreme bargaining powers.
Moreover, this assumption deviates from Mookherjee and Reichelstein's (1992) framework in













The thin line represents any split (U1;U 2) of the full information expected
proﬁt Eµ[¼(x¤
µ;µ)]. The thick line represent any splits (U1;U 2) of the second-
best expected proﬁt Eµ[¼(xsb
µ ;µ)], that is the maximal utility levels that can be
achieved with incentive-compatible contracts. First-best surplus is attained (with
asymmetric information) when the thick line crosses the thin line. Otherwise, it
is strictly below it. The distance between the two lines increases with the gap
between U1 and U2. For extreme values of U1 and U2, no incentive-compatible
contract can be designed.11 We now turn to bilateral contracting.
4 Second-best implementation in bilateral contracting
In this section I focus on two speciﬁc allocations of partial authority. I consider
the cases of 1 having partial authority on P(A)=ffaLl;a Lhg;faHl;a Hhgg and 2
11This is mostly due to limited liability which forces the player who has bargaining power to
allow its partner an informational rent.
12having partial authority on P(A)=ffaLl;a Hlg;faLh;a Hhgg. In the ﬁrst case of
1's partial authority, the contract is carried out in this 1-partial authority subgame:
3.1 Player 1 chooses a subset ˆ A 2f f aLl;a Lhg;faHl;a Hhgg.
3.2 Player 2 chooses an allocation ˆ a 2 ˆ A.
3.3 The decision is executed and transfers are paid as prescribed by the contract.
The second case is symmetric.
An allocation faµgµ2Ω can be implemented as PBE of the i-partial authority







µ] ¸ Ui IRi
Eµ[uj(xµ;µ j)+t
j




























This set of constraints includes the same individual rationality, limited liability and
budget balance constraints as those in the benchmark game. Player i's incentive
constraint are also unchanged. They still hold in expectation because i does
not know j's information when making its decision. However, Player j's incentive
constraint must now hold for each state of nature µ rather than only in expectation.
To be precise, IC
j
µ tells us that, given that i has revealed its information by
selecting a subset in its decision set, j has incentive to select the right decision,
thereby revealing its own information. In other words, j takes the decision with
full information but restricted alternatives.
Proposition 3 A contract implements second-best decisions by assigning author-
ity to:
² Player 1 when U1 ¸ p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(x¤
Lµ2)jH],
² Player 2 when U2 ¸ p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(x¤
µ1l)jh].
13Other assignments of authority might not implement the second-best decisions.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps. First, I show that the second-best de-
cisions can be implemented when Player 1 has authority for U1 ¸ p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(x¤
Lµ2)jH].
The second part (i.e. Player 2) is symmetric. Second, I provide an illustrative ex-
ample in which the second-best decisions cannot be implemented when authority
is assigned contrary to what Proposition 3 recommends.
Step 1: fxsb




µ1l)jh] · U2 · p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(x¤
µ1l)jh]. Consider
the second-best allocation fasb
µ gµ2Ω that satisﬁes x¤
µ1h = x¤




µ1l] and U2 = p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(xsb






µ1l) for µ1 = H;L, t1
µ = ¡t2
µ for every µ 2 Ω.
It is easy to show that this second-best allocation satisﬁes all the constraints as-
sociated with the 1-partial authority game. In particular, LL1




µ1h;µ 1h) ¡ ∆u2(xsb
µ1l). Adding and subtracting
u1(xsb
µ1l;µ 1) yields ¼(x¤
µ1h;µ 1h) ¡ ¼(xsb
µ1l;µ 1h)+¼(xsb
µ1l;µ 1l) which is strictly posi-
tive since ¼(x¤
µ1h;µ 1h) >¼ (xsb
µ1l;µ 1h) for µ1 = H;L. Hence, the two constraints
LL1
Hh and LL1
Lh are satisﬁed. For higher U2, transfers t2
µ can be increased to
satisfy the constraints associated with the 1-partial authority game.
Step 2: Example where fxsb
µ gµ2Ω is not implemented when partial authority is
assigned to 1 when U2 <p (h)Eµ1[∆u2(x¤
µ1ljh].
Consider a vertical relationship between a retailer/a marketing unit labelled 1
and a supplier/a production unit labelled 2. They contract/design an organization
to produce x units. The production unit incurs production costs µ2x while the
marketing unit enjoys a total receipt (µ1 ¡x)x. In this case, µ2 2f l;hg stands for
(constant) unit production costs and µ1 2f L;Hg represents the level of demand.
Preferences are deﬁned by the following functions:
² u1(x;µ1)=( µ1 ¡ x)x.
² u2(x;µ2)=¡µ2x,
The proﬁt is ¼(x;µ)=( µ1 ¡x)x¡µ2x: Its is maximized at x¤
µ = µ1 ¡ µ2
2 for every
µ 2 Ω, and yields ¼(x¤
µ;µ)=(µ1 ¡ µ2)2
4 .
14To be consistent with the general framework, it is assumed that H>Land
h<l .12 Suppose that µ1 and µ2 are independent and identically distributed with
equal probability 1
2 to be low or high. To guarantee interior solutions with these
parameters, we impose L ¡ l>H¡ L and L ¡ l>l¡ h.
Now suppose that U2 is at its lower bound in Proposition 2, formally U2 =
p(h)Eµ1[∆u2(xm2
µ1l)jh]. For the functional forms assumed here, xm2
Ll = 2L ¡ H ¡ l
2
and xm2
Hl = L ¡ l




Hhg can only be
implemented with transfers t2
µ1l = ¡u2(xm2
µ1l;l)=¡t1
µ1l for µ1 = H;L so that
Player 2 is left on its limited liability or participation constraint ex-post in states
Ll and Hl.
Suppose that, contrary to what Proposition 3 recommends, partial authority
is assigned to Player 2. Assume that the state of nature is Ll. Then, after Player
2 has selected faHl;a Llg, Player 1 prefers to select aHl rather than aLl. By doing
so he gets u1(xm2
Hl;L)+t1
Hl = ¼(xm2










This destroys incentive-compatibility. Of course, since the model is symmetric,
the same exercise can be reproduced for Player 1 having authority when U1 =
p(H)Eµ2[∆u1(xm1
Lµ2)jH].2
The above result is twofold. First, it tells us that a bilateral contract can
achieve the second-best outcome. Therefore, players can avoid contracting with
a third party. Second, it shows that authority or decision rights matter. For
some realistic parameters, the second-best outcome can be achieved only with the
appropriate assignment of authority. In the proof, I provide an example in which
the second-best decisions cannot be implemented with an unsuitable assignment of
authority. Hence, a wrong hierarchical structure might lead to Pareto dominated
outcomes. Figure 2 below provides a graphic representation of Proposition 3.
















The second best expected surplus in thick curve ABCD can be achieved i)
with Player 1's authority but not necessarily with Player 2's authority on the part
AB; ii) with either Player 1's or 2's authority on the part BC; iii) with Player 2's
authority but not necessarily with Player 1's authority on the part CD. The result
can be summarized as follow.
Theorem Authority goes together with a higher share of the surplus.
5 Concluding comments
I conclude with three brief comments. Firstly, the above theorem ﬁnds some
empirical support in Lerner and Merges (1998). Lerner and Merges analyze an
original data set on technological alliances between drug companies and biotech
start-ups. As mentioned above, these alliances are contracts signed to develop,
produce and sell new drugs. Pharmaceutical companies provide biotech ﬁrms with
ﬁnancial resources to cover their development costs. These deals explicitly specify
16the allocation of control rights in several tasks (e.g. management of clinical trials,
manufacture of ﬁnal product, marketing, right to expand the alliance) which,
according to interviewed managers, seems to be “a central issue” raised during
the negotiations. The authors found strong evidence that the allocation of control
rights depends mainly on the ﬁnancial condition of the biotech ﬁrm. Biotech
ﬁrms in bad ﬁnancial condition tend to retain less control rights; suggesting that
biotech ﬁrms' control is negatively correlated with drug companies' investment.
This empirical result is consistent with our theorem: for higher investment levels,
the drug company asks for a higher share of the total surplus and, therefore, is
more likely to retain authority.
Secondly, the eﬃcient hierarchical architectures stipulate partial and not full
authority. This is because all private information has valuable for the organiza-
tion. Some form of delegation is therefore needed to beneﬁt from the subordinate's
information. Full authority would naturally arise in a one-sided asymmetric in-
formation framework. In this case, the second-best allocation is implemented by
letting the informed player choose a single decision in the contract menu, as in
principal-agent models.
Lastly, the analysis is reduced to bilateral contracting among risk-neutral part-
ners. An interesting extension would be to introduce risk aversion into agents'
preferences. By moving incentive constraints from ex-ante to interim, the alloca-
tion of authority aﬀects risk-sharing. The eﬃcient assignment of authority would
then trade-oﬀ risk-sharing and bargaining power. Another extension would be to
generalize the model to more than two contracting partners. These extensions are,
of course, beyond the scope of the present paper.
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